

PANIC!

IT'S AN ARTS EMERGENCY

***Panic! Social Class, Taste and Inequalities
in the Creative Industries***

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This report forms part of *Panic! It's an Arts Emergency* project, and draws on several academic papers.² Those papers, which are all available via the web links in the text, have been written in collaboration with several co-authors. More information can be found in the Introduction and Appendix.

The authors commissioned Create London to deliver a cultural programme around the themes of this research. As part of this, Create London and the Barbican will convene an afternoon of discussion at the Barbican Centre, to reflect on the content of this report and share it with the sector and the public: www.barbican.org.uk/whats-on/event/panic-2018.

Panic! It's an Arts Emergency additionally comprises a public resource by Arts Emergency, a creative careers project for young people, and a new work by artist Ellie Harrison. It is a continuation of a project initiated by Create London in 2015, which included a nationwide survey of artists and creative industries workers (the *Panic!* dataset) and follow up interviews. Find out more about all of the above at: www.createlondon.org/event/panic2018/

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2. This report draws on several papers, both working papers and published final versions. The academic papers are all available from the web links in the text, and have been written in collaboration with several co-authors. We'd like to thank Peter Campbell (University of Liverpool), Sam Friedman (London School of Economics), Daniel Laurison (Swarthmore College), Siobhan McAndrew (University of Bristol), Andrew Miles (University of Manchester), and Kate Oakley (University of Leeds).

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Introduction

The idea of a fair and diverse industry is central to current discussions about cultural and creative jobs. However, as this report will demonstrate, the cultural and creative industries are marked by significant inequalities; in particular, we look at the social class background of the workforce, and how this intersects with other issues, including attitudes and values, experiences of working for free, social networks, and cultural tastes.

Inequality in the arts regularly forms the basis for public discussions about culture in Britain. For example, we have recently seen scandals over gender pay gaps at the BBC; political inquiries about working class representation in the theatre industry; and a wealth of blogging and social media commentary focused on representations of race and ethnicity in the arts.

What is missing is an understanding of the *scale* of social inequalities, along with a clearer understanding of how these inequalities operate.

This was the starting point for a team of academics from the Universities of Edinburgh and Sheffield who undertook research funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council, as part of a scheme to create public impact with academic research on the creative economy. This public impact is being co-produced and delivered through the *Panic!* 2018 project, led by Create London. Create London in turn is working in partnership with the Barbican Centre and Arts Emergency to deliver a cultural programme around the themes of this research. The report creatively visualises data and analysis. Full tables, graphs, and figures are available from the academic papers.

This report presents:

- the first analysis of cultural and creative workers' values and attitudes, using data from the British Social Attitudes Survey
- the first analysis of cultural and creative workers' cultural attendance, using data from the Department for Culture, Media and Sport's (now the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport) Taking Part Survey
- the first analysis of social mobility into cultural occupations using data from the Office for National Statistics' Longitudinal Study
- an analysis of the demographics of the cultural and creative workforce using the Office for National Statistics' Labour Force Survey

- analysis of survey and interview data from the 2015 *Panic! What happened to social mobility in the arts?* project. This analysis demonstrates participants' experiences and understandings of unpaid work; their social capital; and their views on getting in and getting on in cultural and creative occupations.

The report adopts an inter-sectional approach to workforce inequalities, where the data allows. As a result, the report shows that the cultural and creative sector is marked by significant exclusions of those from working class social origins. We try to demonstrate how it intersects with other characteristics, primarily gender and ethnicity. Women, and those from Black and Minority Ethnic (BAME) communities face barriers in addition to those associated with social class origin. Class as discussed in the report is much more than media clichés about “the white working class”.

In terms of social class, social mobility has been a longstanding problem for the sector, meaning that it is currently dominated by those from affluent social origins. There was also no 'golden age' for social mobility within the cultural sector.

At the same time, our analysis of the *Panic!* dataset shows those respondents who are the best paid are most likely to think the sector rewards talent and hard work, and are least likely to see exclusions of class, ethnicity and gender in the workforce.

The *Panic!* data also shows respondents' limited social networks: how the creatives responding to the *Panic!* Survey tended to know other creatives, to the exclusion of many other occupations.

The workforce inequalities are reinforced by the prevalence of unpaid labour. *Panic!* respondents overwhelmingly said they had worked for free.

Alongside the inequalities in the workforce, this report paints a picture of a cultural sector which is exclusive in more subtle ways.

The analysis shows the taste patterns of cultural workers are substantially different from those of the rest of the population; this difference is replicated in workers' values and attitudes, which are the most liberal and left wing of any set of occupations.

The report summarises a specific set of research papers, using specific datasets. As a result, it is not a comprehensive picture of every axis of social inequality. Much more research is needed on, for example, the impact of disability on the creative workforce and on arts audiences.

However, the research presented and summarised here is an important challenge for the cultural industries in Britain.

Part 1: Getting in and getting on: Beliefs in meritocracy⁴

To begin, we introduce data from the *Panic!* Survey which took place in 2015, and which received 2,487 unique responses.

We explore how a high proportion of respondents to the original *Panic!* Survey believe that success in their sector is based on hard work and talent (otherwise known as ‘meritocratic’ beliefs); and how the survey respondents who are most attached to this idea are highly-paid white men, irrespective of age.

We then use data from the 237 interviews conducted following the *Panic!* Survey to illustrate how these meritocratic beliefs are talked about and experienced.

This is troubling, as the faith in the sector’s meritocracy may signal a belief that little or nothing should change. Particularly worrying is the fact that those people who are in the best position to effect change are the very people who most strongly support the meritocratic explanation.

This discussion sets the scene for the rest of the report, as we go on to show how the prevailing belief in meritocracy is not matched by the reality of the sector.

The starting point for showing this mismatch comes from analysing the social networks or the ‘social capital’ of *Panic!* respondents.

The analysis shows our cultural and creative workers have narrow social networks, suggesting a type of social closure within the sector.

***Panic!* respondents believe in meritocracy**

Did our *Panic!* Survey respondents think the cultural and creative industries were fair? We used responses to a standard set of questions about working in the creative industries to understand a respondent’s perceptions of fairness in the sector.

We asked: ‘Looking at your creative occupation as a whole, how important do you think each of these is in getting ahead?’ We offered a range of answers for them to rate in terms of importance:

- coming from a wealthy family;
- having well-educated parents;
- being well educated;
- having ambition;

4. This analysis is based on Taylor, M. and O’Brien, D. (2017) “‘Culture is a meritocracy’: Why creative workers’ attitudes may reinforce social inequality,” *Sociological Research Online* 22(4). Available from <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1360780417726732>

- hard work;
- knowing the right people;
- your talent;
- your ethnic group;
- your gender;
- your class;
- your religion.

This question, and the range of responses, is used in standard surveys internationally and is validated as a way of exploring people's attitudes.

In our analysis, we grouped the responses along three lines.

First there were responses associated with 'meritocracy'. These include talent, ambition, and hard work. This cluster of responses suggests individuals get rewarded for what they put in, or receive what they deserve from the sector, irrespective of background or privileges.


Our second group reflects what social scientists call 'social reproduction' explanations, such as networks (who you know), family background and wealth, along with gender and ethnicity. These explanations point to barriers in the cultural sector, so that no matter how talented or hard working someone is, they will still struggle if they aren't part of the same class, ethnicity, and/or gender as the people hiring and promoting them.

Finally, there are responses associated with education - people's own, and their parents'. These responses didn't fit closely with either set of responses. Research shows a strong relationship between someone's level of education and their abilities, but also finds that people from middle class homes have better access to elite educational institutions.

Figure 1 shows the pattern of our respondents' answers relating to meritocracy and social reproduction.

At the top left-hand corner we find those respondents (30%) who most strongly think that talent and hard work explains getting in and getting on in the cultural and creative industries (CCIs), and do not agree that class and knowing the right people are important. These respondents describe the sector as 'meritocratic'.

Figure 1 How responses cluster around meritocracy or social reproduction





This person believes ambition, hard work and talent, as well as ethnicity, class and gender all very important or essential to getting ahead. They combine both meritocracy and social reproduction explanations for success.



This person believes ambition, hard work and talent are essential to getting ahead, but ethnicity, class, and coming from a wealthy family are not important at all to getting ahead. They suggest meritocracy explains success.



This person believes ethnicity, class and gender were not important at all, and that ambition, hard work and talent were only fairly important. They emphasise neither meritocracy nor social reproduction in their explanation of success.



This person believes coming from a wealthy family, knowing the right people and class are very important to success, but talent and hard work were not very important. They suggest social reproduction explains success.

By contrast to the top left hand corner, those respondents clustered in the bottom right hand corner (21%) were most likely to suggest 'social reproduction'. These respondents emphasised social barriers or exclusions, rather than talent or hard work.

The top right-hand corner clusters those (34%) who emphasised *both* social reproduction and meritocracy; those believing hard work and talent are essential, but acknowledging the roles of barriers and exclusions.

Finally, those respondents in the bottom left-hand corner (16%) emphasise neither, perhaps believing that success in the CCIs is more-or-less random.

As we can see, the majority of respondents are in the top area of the plot. This suggests the prevailing opinion among our survey respondents was towards a belief that the sector is meritocratic.

Some respondents recognised the influence of social factors, such as class, age, race, and 'who you know'. But the majority of respondents believe that hard work, talent, and ambition are essential to getting ahead.

To put this in some context, the people at the meeting point of the four sections described coming from a wealthy family and class as fairly important, ambition and talent as very important, and hard work as essential. So almost all the people whom we have classified as believing in social reproduction will have drawn on some element of the meritocracy characteristics in their explanation for success.

Levels of agreement with these explanations of “getting in and getting on” in the sector were similar across the demographics of our respondents, with similar stories told by women, by people of working class origin, and by people from ethnic minority backgrounds.

However, there is one group that stands out – the highly paid. These respondents, who are in the most influential positions in the creative industries, believe most strongly in meritocracy. They are also most sceptical of the impact of social factors, such as gender, class or ethnicity, on explanations for success in the sector.

Interestingly, the best paid and those in senior roles hold these attitudes irrespective of their starting point in life. It seems, looking at the *Panic!* respondents, once people have achieved major success within the sector they become most committed to talent and hard work as explaining that success. Those who most believed in meritocracy in the sector, and who were least likely to believe in social reproduction, were those being paid more than £50,000 per year.

We saw this combination of beliefs in meritocracy and social reproduction in many of the discussions with our interviewees.

Rachel, Kate and Zoe all used ‘hard work’, or ‘meritocracy’ explanations for success. For example, they stressed hard work and tenacity, rather than their class, or networks in their perceptions of success:

‘Most people who have got successful would have had to be quite tenacious is that the word? In terms of like keeping on submitting things and like going up for competitions or trying to get involved with events and things, because yeah it is hard to get anywhere if you are quite shy or lacking in confidence I suppose.’

– Rachel, a white middle class social origin woman in her 30s, working in publishing

‘I genuinely think keeping going is a huge part of it. You know when I was in my early 30’s a lot of friends stopped being actors and writers and they stopped because they wanted to buy houses or they wanted to have children and they wanted the security... However, the main difference was tenacity in my view because I haven’t been lucky.’

– Kate, a white working class social origin woman in her 50s, working in publishing

‘I think there is a bit of luck to it, but I think at the end of the day the people who will succeed are really the people who are willing to sacrifice the most for it... I think it is the people who are willing to give up the other bits of their life who are most likely to succeed.’

– Zoe, a white, middle class social origin woman in her 20s, working in theatre

We can contrast this with ‘social reproduction’ explanations. Nisha and Jennifer both cite the importance of social networks in their stories of who is successful.

‘The UK film industry is not a meritocracy at all. It doesn’t matter if you’re intelligent or well qualified or any of those things. What matters is who you know and who you’ve worked with.’

- Nisha, a British Asian woman from middle class social origins in her 30s, working in film and television

‘I think the trouble with the arts industry is that it’s so based on networking and the sort of social skills, how you behave at openings... I have a colleague who is a freelance artist. He’s from a middle class background and he’s a bloke. I was just left stunned by his ability to just introduce himself and start talking to people and networking in the middle of this seminar.’

- Jennifer, a white working class origin woman in her 60s, working in visual arts

Jennifer connects the characteristics of male, middle class-ness to success at networking, and networking to success in the arts.


Existing academic research has demonstrated that networks, (who you know), are crucial to getting in and getting on in the creative industries. This is especially true in those creative occupations that are predominantly freelance.

Just hard work? Or does it help to know people?

What sort of jobs were included in the networks of our *Panic!* respondents? As part of the *Panic!* Survey we asked the 2,487 respondents to tell us about their networks. We asked if they knew people in a range of different jobs, whether as friends or as family members.

Figure 2 shows the *Panic!* Survey respondents’ answers to ‘who do you know?’

Figure 2 Which occupations do creative workers know?



This diagram shows how *Panic!* respondents were disproportionately likely to know other cultural and creative workers and less likely to know people working in non-creative jobs (as friends, family members and colleagues). They seem to know other creatives, rather than knowing factory workers, bus drivers or solicitors, although they were also likely to know lecturers, and sales assistants. Broadly, the jobs they were least likely to know people in were traditionally working class jobs, such as factory workers, bus drivers, and postal workers, although they were also unlikely to know bank managers.

This is as expected, given the nature of their occupational networks, and may reflect the fact that those in middle class occupations tend not to know many people in working class occupations, either as friends or as family members. It may also reflect the smaller numbers of traditional 'working class' occupations in society overall (as we discuss in Part 2).

Conclusion

One way of reading these results is to conclude that knowing other creatives is essential for finding work. The socially homogeneous nature of our respondents may simply reflect the need to know other creatives for work.

Likewise, the prevailing opinion in the *Panic!* responses was that the sector is fair. Hard work is the most important thing for getting ahead, talent is rewarded, and a person's religion, gender, ethnicity, and class are much less important.

However, these interpretations raise questions in the context of inequalities in the sector.

First, to what extent are cultural and creative occupations accessible to all? Especially if they are, by occupational network, quite homogeneous? Moreover, even the shared belief in meritocracy has some important distinctions, as the quotes from Nisha and Jennifer suggested. These distinctions can be mapped onto broader social inequalities.

To what extent is the cultural sector delivering on representing individuals, communities and the nation if *Panic!* data suggests its social networks are relatively homogenous and coherent? And if its workers share a belief in meritocracy?

Looking at our CCIs, who is missing from the picture? Parts 2, 3 and 4 suggest culture is marked by serious inequalities and is not the meritocracy *Panic!* respondents think it is.

Part 2: Culture's unequal workforce: How people of Working Class origin have been and continue to be excluded

'It's just so important, because people don't believe you. People just think that you have a chip on your shoulder, and I hate that. That's why I don't talk about it. I don't want people to think that I have a chip on my shoulder, but I just feel, and I really don't think I'm being paranoid, but I just really feel that the mathematics don't add up, and I don't think it's a skills gap issue, which everyone would like you to believe. I think it's a hiring issue, and I think it's a systemic issue.

I wouldn't care so much if it was a systemic and hiring issue in banking, but I care because it's in the arts. It really fucking sucks that it's in the arts, because we're suffering because of it, and this country and its cultural output is suffering because of it.'

- Nisha, a British Asian woman from middle class social origins in her 30s, working in film and television. *Panic!* Survey respondent.

The quote above illustrates a key frustration at the gap between perceptions of the sector and the reality in terms of who is in the workforce and how workers make a living.

Moreover, Nisha's comment draws attention to why who works in the arts is such an important issue.

In this part, we contrast the belief in hard work and talent as explanations for success, discussed in Part 1, with the reality of the makeup of the workforce.

Currently, a key characteristic of the British cultural and creative workforce is the absence of those from working class social origins. At the same time, there are significant under-representations of women and those from minority ethnic communities in specific cultural occupations such as Film, TV, video, radio and photography; and Music, performing, and visual art.

People working within culture, making culture, are not currently representative of the nation's demographics and there is more work to be done to truly make the workforce open to all.

We also show that this is a longstanding problem, there was no 'golden age' for social mobility and equality in cultural occupations.


Who works in cultural and creative occupations?

Inequalities and exclusions in the current workforce are demonstrated in findings from two academic papers analysing Office for National Statistics (ONS) data on the British workforce.⁵


In the Appendix you can find a table with the the basic demographics of the occupations constituting the cultural and creative industries in the UK. In Figure 3 we highlight some key findings. We use ethnicity, gender and class⁶ as three demographic categories to show issues of inequality in the jobs producing culture in the UK.

Figure 3 Creative Industries Workforce Demographics

Ethnicity



Class




⁵. This analysis is based on O'Brien, D., Laurison, D., Friedman, S. and Miles, A. (2016). 'Are the creative industries meritocratic? An analysis of the 2014 British Labour Force Survey', *Cultural Trends*, 25, 116-131. Available from www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09548963.2016.1170943?journalCode=ccut20

and Oakley, K., Laurison, D., O'Brien, D. and Friedman, S. (2017) 'Cultural Capital: Arts Graduates, Spatial Inequality, and London's Impact on Cultural Labor Markets', *American Behavioral Scientist* 61(12), 1510-1531. Available from <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0002764217734274>

⁶. National Statistics Socio-economic Classification (NS-SEC) categories are fully explained in the 'Key terms' section of the Appendix at the end of this report. They are the categories we use to understand social class origins, based on parental occupation.

Gender



First, it is worth noting how much the occupational sectors differ from each other. IT, which includes IT consultancy as well as game development, has a good representation of those from minority ethnic backgrounds, but has a very low number of women in its workforce.

In contrast, the arts are not diverse in terms of ethnicity. The following sectors have particularly low numbers of Black and Minority Ethnic (BAME) workers: Museums, galleries and libraries (2.7%); Film, TV, video, radio and photography (4.2%); and Music, performing and visual arts (4.8%).

Almost every occupational sector has an underrepresentation of women in its workforce, with Publishing (52.9%) and Museums, galleries and libraries (64.8%) the only two sectors where women are not under-represented compared to the workforce overall.

The story of social class within this story is one of exclusion. Every sector apart from Crafts, which includes smiths, glass makers and ceramicists, has an over-representation of those from upper middle class⁷ social origins, with those from working class origins making up far less of the workforce.

The situation in Publishing is especially grave, with over a third of the workers from the upper middle class social origins and only about an eighth from working class origins.

People from upper middle class origins are overrepresented in many creative occupations, compared to those from working class origins.

They are also overrepresented compared to the overall numbers of upper middle class origin and working class origin in the labour force as a whole. It appears that creative jobs are thus highly exclusive.

⁷ We are focused on just the higher managerial and professional for our analysis. Because of this we use the term 'upper middle class social origins'. This group corresponds to those people who grew up in a household where the main income earner worked in a higher managerial or professional job, part of the ONS' NS-SEC I category. We've used this term as it is clearer than repeating 'professional and managerial' or using NS-SEC I within the text.

Again, aside from Crafts, no creative occupation comes close to having a third of its workforce from working class⁸ origins, which is the average for the population as a whole.

At the same time, every set of creative occupations aside from Crafts has many more workers from the upper middle class origin, compared to just under a seventh of the population as a whole.

Inequality and location – London and beyond

The national picture presents even more of an issue when we consider regional inequalities. A recent report by the Centre for Economic Performance⁹ showed how disproportionately creative businesses in the UK are clustered in the South East of England, particularly in London. As we know, the cost of living is higher in London than in the rest of the UK, which is important to remember in the context of Part 3's discussion of unpaid work. London also has a different, more diverse population.

Our analysis finds important differences in the cultural and creative industry workforce in London, as compared to the rest of the country.

There is some good news about London's creative workforce. In a paper published in *American Behavioral Scientist* in 2017, Oakley and her co-authors found gender inequalities were not as pronounced in London (60.5 % of London's creative workforce are men, compared to just under 70% in other urban areas in the UK) and there is a better representation of ethnic minorities (17% of London's creative workforce are BAME individuals, compared to 6% of the creative workforce in the rest of the UK).¹⁰

However, data from the 2011 census indicates BAME individuals are 39% of London's working age population. This suggests that even the good demographic news about London's cultural and creative industries still speaks to significant exclusions of the city's population.

Just as the story of ethnicity and creative occupations in London is a cause for concern, the story of social class is equally worrying. Over a third (34.8%) of the creative workforce in London are from upper-middle class origins. This is significantly more than the cre-

⁸ Likewise, we use 'working class social origins' to correspond to parental NS-SEC VI-VIII. This group of people are defined as having grown up in a household where the main income earner worked in a semi-routine or routine manual job, or was long term unemployed.

⁹ Bernick, S., Davies, R. and Valero, A. (2017) *Industry in Britain – An Atlas* CfEP Special Paper 34. Available from <http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/special/cepsp34.pdf>

¹⁰ All figures on London are taken from Oakley, K., Laurison, D., O'Brien, D. and Friedman, S. (2017) 'Cultural Capital: Arts Graduates, Spatial Inequality, and London's Impact on Cultural Labor Markets', *American Behavioral Scientist* 61(12) 1510–1531. Available from <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0002764217734274>

ative workers in the rest of the UK (23% from these origins).

You don't *have* to be from an economically privileged background to work in London, where the bulk of creative and cultural jobs are located, but coming from an upper middle class background offers significant advantages for people struggling to make it in the capital.

Pay inequalities

The picture from the ONS data is of a workforce for cultural occupations that is marked by significant exclusions, by class, gender and ethnicity. The same ONS data also shows important gaps in pay, based on gender and social class origin. In a 2016 paper published in *Cultural Trends*, O'Brien and his co-authors found important differences in pay for creative workers.

Across all creative industries women are estimated to earn £5,800 less per year than otherwise similarly employed men. The situation is especially bad in the Film, TV, video, radio and photography occupational sector, with estimates of a £15,000 per year gender pay gap.¹¹

In terms of class origin, there are clear pay gaps between those from upper-middle class origins and those from working class starting points. For example, in Publishing there is evidence of a class pay gap of up to £23,000 a year. However, much of this class pay gap is related to individuals' education levels. This does not account for the gender pay gap identified in analysis of the cultural workforce.

Gaps in pay mean that even when women or those from working class origins make it into cultural occupations, they still struggle to compete with colleagues who are male or from upper-middle class starting points.

Change over time: social mobility in creative occupations since 1981¹²

What about change over time, rather than just in the current workforce?

11. Figures from O'Brien, D., Laurison, D., Friedman, S., and Miles, A. (2016). 'Are the creative industries meritocratic? An analysis of the 2014 British Labour Force Survey', *Cultural Trends*, 25, 116–131. Available from www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09548963.2016.1170943?journalCode=ccut20

12. This analysis is drawn from the full working paper on social mobility into creative jobs available from Brook, O., O'Brien, D. & Taylor, M., 2018. 'There was no golden age: social mobility into cultural and creative occupations'. Available from www.osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/7njy3

Our research shows that some of the fears about declining social mobility in cultural jobs are a reflection of broader social change.

The longstanding barriers stopping people from working class origins getting cultural jobs are now combined with changes in Britain's class structure. This means social inequalities in the cultural workforce are more evident.

There are two aspects to the importance of social mobility in creative jobs: first, what are the chances of people from different origins getting this kind of work? This relates to social justice, openness and equality of opportunity.

Second, what is the social class mix of those working in cultural jobs at different points in time? This tells us something about the diversity of life experiences and backgrounds represented in the sector, which will influence the culture that is produced and commissioned.

From our analysis of the Labour Force Survey we can see cultural jobs have major representation issues when it comes to class, gender and ethnicity.¹³ We now focus on how one of these categories, class, has changed over time.

Here we present analysis of the ONS Longitudinal Study,¹⁴ which takes a 1% sample of Census returns in England and Wales since 1971 and links life events through time. This lets us see what individuals' parents' jobs were when they were teenagers, along with the individuals' jobs in subsequent censuses. (More details about this method and about defining social class can be found in the Appendix to this report.)


Here we compare those born between 1953 and 1962 (now aged 56–65) to those born between 1983 and 1992 (now aged 26–35).

Figure 4 shows our two cohorts, the oldest in the top half of the graph. The left hand side are working in the core cultural and artistic occupations, the right are all jobs across the economy.

¹³. This section only addresses trends in class-based inequalities. Other trends are addressed in the full working paper. For example, the relationship between gender, ethnicity and class over time is complicated, as women and BAME groups have increased their educational qualifications at a greater rate than white men. This affects occupational status. There has also been greater growth in working-age people of BAME origin. These facts, in combination with small sample sizes for creative jobs, make discussion of these statistical relationships beyond the scope of this report.

¹⁴. The permission of the Office for National Statistics to use the Longitudinal Study is gratefully acknowledged, as is the help provided by staff of the Centre for Longitudinal Study Information and User Support (CeLSIUS). CeLSIUS is supported by the ESRC Census of Population Programme (Award Ref: ES/K000365/1). The authors alone are responsible for the interpretation of the data.

Figure 4 Class origins of employees in arts and cultural jobs compared to all jobs



The chart, on the left-hand side shows the proportion of people from different social backgrounds entering ‘core’ cultural occupations from each cohort, at the time of the census when they were aged 19–28 (1981 and 2011 respectively). Upper-middle class origins (parents in professional and higher managerial occupations) are shown in pink, and working class in pattern. We define our core cultural occupations as artists, musicians, actors, and as workers in publishing, media, libraries, museums and galleries.

The chart on the right, shows those aged 19–28 in the entire workforce, again contrasting those from upper middle class with working class origins.

This analysis lets us make two points. First about the *proportion* of upper-middle class origin people in cultural occupations; second about the *chances* of different people getting into cultural jobs, over time.

The proportion of young cultural workers from upper-middle class backgrounds more than doubled between 1981 and 2011, from 15% to 33%. The proportion from working class origins dropped by about a third, from 22% to 13% over the same period. In 1981 there were more young people from working class origins entering creative jobs than from upper-middle class origins; this situation had reversed in 2011.

As has been discussed in the media, those who entered creative jobs in the late 1970s and early 1980s see those entering recently as

being more likely to be from upper middle class backgrounds than their own peer group were. These results confirm the *perceptions* of the increasing domination of creative jobs by those from upper-middle class, professional and managerial, backgrounds.

However, this is as a result of changes to Britain's class structure. The chances of different social groups getting into cultural jobs have been stable and have not in fact changed.

Young people from upper-middle class origins were disproportionately represented in creative jobs, compared to their numbers in the economy overall, by a factor of 2 in both the 1981 and 2011 Census. (15% vs 7%, 33% vs 16%).

Young people from working class origins were by contrast, under-represented, having only half the proportion of the creative workforce compared to all jobs, in both 1981 and 2011 (38% vs 22%; 22% vs 13%). So, in terms of opportunities, and fairness, the situation did not change between 1981 and 2011.

What has changed is the underlying social class structure of England and Wales. Over the past 40 years the proportion of the population from upper middle class, professional and managerial, origins has increased substantially. The proportion in traditionally working class jobs has reduced dramatically. This is due to reduced numbers in manufacturing and other manual labour. In 1981, people aged between 19 and 28 were about five times as likely to have working class parents as upper-middle class parents; in 2011, this had dropped to one and a half times as likely.

The story of social mobility into core cultural occupations is therefore complicated. The chances of young people getting into cultural work, according to their social origin, has not changed substantially, over time. At the same time, the class origins of those entering these jobs has changed dramatically, as the disproportionately high chances of those from upper middle class origins 'getting in' combines with the larger number of upper middle class origin people in British society.

The fact that, in terms of opportunities and fairness, the situation has not changed does not give cause for complacency. People from working class origins have faced, and still face, substantial barriers in gaining entry to creative jobs. It seems there was no 'golden age' for social mobility.

Moreover, this change in the social origins of those making and commissioning cultural work has implications for the chances of working class experiences being represented in an informed way.

Conclusion

The reality of who is in the workforce does not match the meritocratic hopes of a high proportion of our *Panic!* respondents.

It also doesn't match the ideals of policy makers and arts organisations, for a more open and diverse cultural sector.

Who works in the sector is a crucial form of inequality. However, the reasons for, and consequences of, this inequality are complex. They include unpaid work, but also more subtle barriers to entry, such as the homogeneous values, attitudes and tastes of people working in cultural occupations. These issues are explored in the following parts.

Part 3: Who gets paid to work in the arts? The problem of unpaid labour in cultural industries¹⁵

This part discusses one reason behind inequality in cultural jobs, by focusing on unpaid work.

Getting paid fairly is a central concern for cultural and creative workers. This is often a result of freelance work, temporary contracts, traineeships, or project-based work. Media debates have highlighted the problem of some people not being paid at all for their creative work.

There are two elements to this discourse. First, unpaid routes into an occupation. For example, until recently unpaid internships were common in publishing and the museums and galleries sectors. Second, working for free once individuals are working regularly or are secure within an occupation. Against this backdrop, Part 3 reports findings from the *Panic!* Survey of 2,487 creative workers and from the 237 follow-up interviews.

Our data suggests unpaid work is endemic across cultural occupations. This is a fact well known to practitioners, policy makers and the public. We develop this well-known fact in several ways.

We show that age and career stage, along with class origin, are the most important drivers for different experiences of unpaid work.

For more experienced workers, unpaid work can be a choice to assist friends and colleagues. It is rarely a form of exploitation. For our respondents who are newer to cultural and creative work, unpaid work is inescapable, particularly in the form of the unpaid internship for those working in advertising and marketing, and in design.

For those from working class backgrounds who were interviewed, unpaid work was seen as inescapable and a form of exploitation. Those from upper-middle class origins expressed the same weight of expectation to work for free but were more likely to describe the potential career benefits of unpaid work.

Unpaid work is endemic to the lives of Panic! Survey respondents

As part of the *Panic!* Survey, we asked cultural workers about their experiences of working for free, across a variety of circumstances,

¹⁵ Part 3 is based on a project working paper: O'Brien, D. and Taylor, M. (2017) "'There's no way that you get paid to do the arts.'" Unpaid labour across the cultural and creative life course'. Available from <https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/28hix>

such as unpaid internships; profit shares (a practice particularly associated with theatre); unpaid labour for oneself, for example time spent on one's portfolio or project development; and working for free while others are being paid. In addition, many respondents drew attention to underpayment for work because of additional hours, or non-payment for overtime or additional hours on projects.

Around 87% of the *Panic!* respondents, irrespective of creative occupation or demographics, reported having worked for free in some way.

An important point to note is how having worked for free is reported by all age groups, suggesting that it is not a new phenomenon.

We can unpack this by looking at how types of free or unpaid work differ. Looking at unpaid internships, we see a much clearer difference by age, with 48% of people under 30 reporting they had done an unpaid internship, as opposed to 34% of our respondents between 30 and 39, 14% of our respondents between 40 and 49, and 6% of our respondents over 50.

We also see that people working in some sectors are much more likely to have done unpaid internships, particularly in Advertising and marketing (46%), in Design: product, graphic and fashion (41%), in Film, TV, video, radio and photography (36%), and in Museums, galleries, and libraries (37%).

Age and class matter

Our survey results suggest that working for free is endemic to cultural and creative occupations.

However, the results also indicate that the unpaid internship is a more recent phenomenon. In order to understand these patterns, we have looked at data from our 237 interviewees, to show how working for free is patterned by age, or career stage, and by social class origin.

For those later in life or later in their careers, and for those from more affluent, middle class, social origins, working for free was often a choice; it was beneficial to them; or it was a form of gift or assistance to others.

For younger, or early career individuals, and those from less affluent, working class, social origins, working for free was primarily a form of exploitation.

Working for free – a dominant story from our younger interviewees

Cat, a white, female artist whose parents were senior managers, captures this experience of the younger creative workers we interviewed

‘I’ve never been paid to make or do anything... I would see anything that I’ve done within a gallery context, that’s all been unpaid. Yes, I have a studio and I do exhibitions relatively frequently and I have done a residency and have worked for a couple of galleries but it’s always been unpaid.’

Sarah, from a working class background with parents in London, now working in the music industry, told a similar story of her creative career. Internships were expected:

‘Job agencies told me that there was no way in hell that I was getting a job in publishing without an unpaid internship.’

But most of these were unpaid:

‘I did an internship... that would have been completely unpaid, I did another internship that was completely unpaid straight after that. Two internships completely unpaid... Over a period of about six months it was three internships, actually four because I started two simultaneously, but the second one, the second one of that simultaneous time was paying me... and that felt very unusual, like I was getting £50 a day.’

Class origin determined if this was a choice, or exploitation

It’s stating the obvious to point out that those with more financial resources to fund living costs are more able to afford unpaid work. Two designers, one from middle class origins and the other from a working class background, illustrate this point.

Polly, a middle class origin respondent sees unpaid work as more of a ‘choice’:

‘I think it’s always been a choice to work. I’ve done some placements which were unpaid and I’ve done some projects which were unpaid or very, very low paid but I never had to do them because I didn’t have other work... I haven’t personally felt like, “If I didn’t do unpaid work, I’d never be able to get a job”.’

Carla, from a working class background, provides the contrast. Her experience was common to our interviews from working class backgrounds. She highlights the necessity of unpaid work, but emphasises the difficulty of working for free without financial support.

‘There were girls in my year, I think, in the summer were... in London, in Shoreditch, being able to work for free, whereas I could only do it for three months and that was a struggle. So, it is something that you really should be doing as a fashion designer because it really does help you, but then if you don’t have the money to do it, you don’t you don’t really get a chance to grow, so it’s not really fair.’

Older workers have very different experiences

These experiences directly contrast with older people’s experience of working unpaid or for free. For older and more established creative workers, the experience of unpaid work was one of underpay or of choice and autonomy.

Des, a senior curator in his 50s, based in London, offered a perspective about autonomy and ability to choose:

‘Well I have chosen to do bits and bobs for free, when I have been a consultant. I think partly that is a generational thing.’

Sandra, a 41-year-old freelancer working across a variety of arts organisations, illustrates the experience of being underpaid and the refusal to work for no pay.

‘Not for free. No. Not necessarily. I have done projects where the fee did not in any way relate to the amount of work that needed doing. I have never done something completely for free.’

This point is crucial for understanding the problem of unpaid work in cultural and creative occupations. Older workers were committed to choice and autonomy in association with working for free and asserting the value of their work.

It is clear that although working for free is endemic to cultural jobs, the experience of it, and workers’ feelings towards it show important differences by age as well as social class.

Conclusion

One of our older interviewees suggested that ‘There’s no way that you get paid to do the arts.’ This is a worrying perception.

Although there is a shared experience of not being paid, it is important to understand how this experience is socially divided. The divisions in the *Panic!* dataset were around age and social class origin.

Understanding these divisions goes some way to explaining why some social groups can use working for free to their advantage in the labour market. Others, specifically the working class origin people whom Part 2 demonstrated are underrepresented in the cultural workforce, do not seem to be benefitting from working for free as a way of accessing their desired occupation.

Unpaid work is a significant barrier to some for getting in and getting on in the cultural sector. However, this is something that is common to many modern professions, including the finance and charity sectors.¹⁶

There are more subtle barriers in cultural occupations, and more differences between cultural workers and other occupations. We explore these, in the form of values and tastes, in Part 4.

¹⁶ Roberts, C. (2017) *The Inbetweeners: The New Role of Graduate Internships in the Graduate Labour Market* IPPR. Available from https://www.ippr.org/files/publications/pdf/inbetweeners-the-new-role-of-internships_Apr2017.pdf

Part 4: Attitudes, values and tastes: An unrepresentative ‘creative class’?

The prevalence of unpaid work is one explanation for inequalities in the cultural sector. In this part, we outline more subtle barriers, based on attitudes and tastes.

Cultural workers have attitudes, values and tastes, that are very different from those of the rest of the population. We begin by exploring the values and attitudes of cultural and creative workers, using data from the British Social Attitudes (BSA) Survey.

The story from the BSA survey data is of a set of cultural and creative industries with attitudes that are the most liberal, most pro-welfare and most left wing of any industry.

We then turn to analysis of the Department for Culture, Media and Sport’s (DCMS) Taking Part Survey. This demonstrates creative industries workers are much more likely to attend arts and cultural activities, and thus have very different tastes from workers in other occupations.

In contrast, most other occupations are characterised by not engaging very heavily in formal cultural activities.

How the values and attitudes of cultural and creative workers differ from the rest of the population.¹⁷

Most occupations are characterised by shared cultures, including and excluding people, often as a result of sharing or not sharing the same set of values.

In some professions this is a formal culture associated with an educational pathway, for example in medicine or law. In other areas of the economy it is much more informal.

To understand the shared culture of creative occupations, we offer several different lines of analysis.

We have already demonstrated the demographics of the creative sector in Part 2. Here we think about the values and attitudes of that workforce.

Our analysis uses six years (2010 to 2015) of British Social Attitudes Survey data. The BSA Survey has run for 35 years, exploring a range of different attitudes in the UK.

We focus on two sets of questions designed to understand whether people are more liberal or authoritarian, and how people position

¹⁷ This summarises the project working paper: McAndrew, S., O’Brien, D. and Taylor, M. (2017) ‘Cultural Values, Imagined Community and Cultural Backlash: Value Divergence and Social Closure among British Creative Workers’. Available from <https://osf.io/wkxs5/>

themselves with respect to left and right in politics. These results are also consistent with responses to questions about social welfare, although we've not highlighted that analysis here.

Figure 5 shows responses to liberal/authoritarian questions and Figure 6 shows responses to left/right politics questions. The results of our analysis are shown by occupational group, comparing cultural and creative workers' values and attitudes to those of people working in sectors as varied as construction, healthcare, finance, and mining.

Figure 5 British Social Attitudes responses to liberal/authoritarian questions by occupational group.





Figure 6 British Social Attitudes responses to left/right questions by occupational group.



Both graphs show a distinct pattern, with cultural and creative workers positioned as the most liberal and most left wing compared to all other industrial sectors.

It might be the case that it is not the sector that is influencing these views, rather the age or level of education of individual workers. Our analysis takes these variables into account, as we explain in the statistical models in our full paper.¹⁸ Even when accounting for things like education level, which is an important influence on values and attitudes, cultural and creative industries' values and attitudes are still different from those of the rest of the population.

¹⁸ This summarises the project working paper: McAndrew, S., O'Brien, D. and Taylor, M. (2017) 'Cultural Values, Imagined Community and Cultural Backlash: Value Divergence and Social Closure among British Creative Workers'. Available from <https://osf.io/wkxs5/>

How cultural sector workers' tastes differs from the rest of the population

This analysis indicates cultural workers have sets of ethical and political values that are different from people in many other occupations in society.

We now turn to cultural workers' tastes, using an analysis of eight waves of the government's Taking Part Survey of cultural engagement in England. Those working in cultural and creative occupations are major outliers in terms of cultural consumption.


Who attends culture in England?

The government's analysis suggests the majority of the population (81%) are engaging in arts activity *at least once a year*¹⁹, but our analysis, which focuses on attending arts events and venues, shows that a third of the population have not attended in the last 12 months, and 22% of the population do not attend any cultural activities included in this survey. *Attending the arts very regularly is only the norm for a minority of English society.*

¹⁹ DCMS (2017) Taking Part Survey: *April to September 2017 (Provisional)*. Available at www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/664921/Mid-year_17-18_TP_release.pdf This document also contains (in Annex B) the definition we use for attending cultural events and venues.


We can illustrate this point by looking at attendance at least once a year for a variety of art forms:²⁰

Figure 7 Percentage of people attending art forms at least once a year



²⁰. This analysis develops work from: Taylor, M. (2016) 'Nonparticipation or different styles of participation? Alternative interpretations from Taking Part', *Cultural Trends* 25(3): 169-181. Available from <http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/102893/27/MT%20Paper%20-%20%2020270516.pdf>

Figure 8 Attendance at cultural activities in England



Figures 8 and 9 show the results of analysing the various cultural activities in the Taking Part Survey, along with responses to the question ‘Have you attended one of or more of the following in the past year?’

In figure 8 the x axis, running from left to right, distinguishes activity from inactivity.

The further away an activity is from the point on the graph where the horizontal and vertical lines cross, the more unusual it is for people to go to it. For example, contemporary dance and opera are very far from where the two lines cross, indicating that attending such events is unusual.

Almost all the categories for *not* attending particular events are closer to the point where these lines cross than their corresponding categories for attending them. So we can say that not attending the activities on the far left hand side of the graph is the norm for the majority of the population.

The cultural forms towards the left hand side are those that have fewest respondents saying they have attended.

Contemporary dance, book events, classical, opera, and ballet are, based on our analysis of the Taking Part Survey, minority pastimes when considered against the norm of non-attendance clustered on the right-hand side of the graph.

The y axis, running from the top to the bottom of **Figure 8** shows the type of culture attended.

Here the split is between 'classical' forms of culture, clustered towards the top of the graph, and contemporary forms, which are nearer to the bottom.

Existing academic research has demonstrated that cultural consumption is closely related to particular forms of inequality, such as education, social status and social class. The sorts of inequalities we see in the labour force are important expressions of similar types of social inequalities. Crucially, who makes and who consumes culture are related by shared social inequalities.

What are the tastes of cultural workers in England?

In this section we look specifically at cultural workers, showing how different the picture is for them.

Figure 9 Cultural attendance by occupation





Figure 9 visualises how arts attendance is patterned by occupation. As we’ve already shown, non-attendance, or ‘not’ doing many art forms regularly is the norm for much of the British population. When this data is considered by groups of occupations we see an obvious set of outliers: those people working in the jobs that are producing culture.

Our visualisation shows that arts workers and media workers have attended 4 times as many art forms in the last year as compared to people in working class occupations.

Even when compared to people in professional occupations, both arts and media workers have higher attendance levels. Our two groups of ‘cultural’ workers attend around one third more art forms than middle class professionals.

The taste division within cultural and creative occupations is not over engagement, as almost all are committed frequent attenders. Rather, it is over the cultural form.

We’ve visualised this using two different colours, pink showing contemporary cultural tastes, pattern showing more classical forms.

For media workers, for example those in film and TV, their tastes are more contemporary, such as street art and festivals. At the same time, they have similar levels of committed engagement as their colleagues in artistic and literary occupations.

These patterns display a *key difference*. The difference that the Taking Part data shows, in relation to cultural engagement, is between those producing culture and the rest of the population.

This is not just a difference as a result of age or education, nor a difference between the professional middle class and working class occupations.

Cultural and creative workers' tastes differ even from those in other occupations classified as NS-SEC I, the upper middle class of professional and managerial occupations such as doctors, engineers and lawyers.

Conclusion

Why do the attitudes, values and tastes of cultural workers matter?

Our analysis of BSA Survey data shows the creative industries as the most liberal and left wing of any sector.

Alongside this analysis, the Taking Part data demonstrates that, by cultural attendance, cultural and creative workers have very different tastes from the rest of the population.

This difference, taken with our analysis of values and attitudes, adds to the picture of a 'creative class' quite distinct from the rest of society.

As American research shows ²¹, cultural tastes play an important role in getting into upper-middle class occupations. Hiring can be a form of 'cultural matching', excluding those who do not have the shared tastes of specific social groups. This is especially true in cultural and creative occupations and is another important and subtle barrier for those seeking to work in the sector.

Second, there is a broader question of representation. **Academic work, along with public debates, demonstrates the mismatch between who is working to make culture and the representations expected by those from outside a predominantly white, male, or middle class 'norm' (or demographic) in industries such as theatre, film and television.**

When seen in the context of the labour force inequalities, and the *Panic!* respondents' closed social networks, this raises questions about the relationship between creative workers and the rest of the population.

²¹ Koppman, S. (2016) 'Different like me: Why cultural omnivores get creative jobs' *Administrative Science Quarterly* 61(2) 291–331

Conclusion

Overall, our findings present a challenge to the sector, particularly given the faith in meritocracy demonstrated by our analysis of the *Panic!* Survey.

We conclude with important questions we believe are raised by this research work:

- To what extent are cultural and creative occupations accessible and ‘meritocratic’ if the demographics of its workers, their social origins, and their networks are relatively homogeneous?
- To what extent is the cultural and creative sector delivering on representing individuals, communities, and the nation if research suggests its tastes, values and attitudes are also relatively coherent?
- How will a sector with such different cultural engagement speak for the rest of a society for whom non-engagement is the norm?
- And, looking at our cultural and creative industries as a whole, who is missing from the picture?

Research and resources

If you'd like to know more about the research underpinning this report, read more detailed analysis, or find references to academic research on these issues, the published and working papers are available as follows:

Meritocracy

Taylor, M. and O'Brien, D. (2017) "Culture is a Meritocracy": Why Creative Workers' Attitudes may Reinforce Social Inequality', *Sociological Research Online* 22(4). Available from <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1360780417726732>

The cultural and creative labour force

Brook, O., O'Brien, D. and Taylor, M. (2018) 'There was no golden age: social mobility into cultural and creative occupations'. Available from <https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/7njy3>

Oakley, K., Laurison, D., O'Brien, D. and Friedman, S. (2017) 'Cultural Capital: Arts Graduates, Spatial Inequality, and London's Impact on Cultural Labor Markets', *American Behavioral Scientist* 61(12), 1510–1531. Available from <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0002764217734274>

O'Brien, D., Laurison, D., Friedman, S. and Miles, A. (2016) 'Are the creative industries meritocratic? An analysis of the 2014 British Labour Force survey', *Cultural Trends* 25, 116–131. Available from www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09548963.2016.1170943?journalCode=ccut20

Working for free

O'Brien, D. and Taylor, M. (2017) "There's no way that you get paid to do the arts." Unpaid labour across the cultural and creative life course'. Available from <https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/28hix>

Values and tastes

Campbell, P., O'Brien, D. and Taylor, M. (2018, forthcoming) 'Cultural Engagement and the Economic Performance of the Cultural and Creative Industries: An occupational critique' *Sociology*

McAndrew, S., O'Brien, D. and Taylor, M. (2017) 'Cultural Values, Imagined Community and Cultural Backlash: Value Divergence and Social Closure among British Creative Workers.' Available from <https://osf.io/wkxs5/>

Taylor, M. (2016) 'Nonparticipation or different styles of participation? Alternative interpretations from Taking Part', *Cultural Trends* 25(3), 169–181. Available from <http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/102893/27/MT%20Paper%20-%2020270516.pdf>

Table 1 Composition of the creative workforce ²²

	% BAME	% WOMEN	UNWEIGHTED NUMBER	NS-SEC 1 PARENTS, %	NS-SEC 2 PARENTS, %	NS-SEC 3-5 PARENTS, %	NS-SEC 6-8 PARENTS, %	TOTAL, %
ADVERTISING AND MARKETING	6.8	45.6	633	30.2	22.6	26.4	20.8	100
ARCHITECTURE	6.8	32.5	152	24.6	23.8	38.5	10.4	100
CRAFTS	6	22.3	167	10.8	11.5	46.2	32.3	100
DESIGN: PRODUCT, GRAPHIC, AND FASHION	6.7	47.7	219	22.5	20.3	38.9	18.9	100
FILM, TV, VIDEO, RADIO, AND PHOTOGRAPHY	4.2	28.4	207	25.8	28.9	34.2	12.4	100
IT, SOFTWARE, AND COMPUTER SERVICES	13.5	14.3	787	22.6	22.6	33.1	21.1	100
PUBLISHING	8.3	52.9	218	37.1	26.3	25.4	12.6	100
MUSEUMS, GALLERIES, AND LIBRARIES	2.7	64.8	74	25.8	28.3	21.7	20.8	100
MUSIC, PERFORMING, AND VISUAL ART	4.8	42.4	220	28.9	20.5	31.6	18.2	100
CCIS COMBINED	8.3	33.4	2,677					
NS-SEC I AND II	9.9	52.1	61,898	13.2	14.6	36.5	35.8	100
ANY OTHER OCCUPATION	8.6	47.6	15,888	20.9	20.2	34.8	24.2	100
TOTAL				13.7	14.9	36.3	35	100

Unweighted Number is number of people in the Labour Force Survey, before models are applied.

NS-SEC 1 Higher managerial and professional occupations

NS-SEC 2 Lower managerial and professional occupations

NS-SEC 3-5 Intermediate occupations (clerical, sales, service), small employers, technical occupations

NS-SEC 6-8 Semi-routine, routine occupations and never worked or long-term unemployed

²² From Oakley, K., Laurison, D., O'Brien, D. and Friedman, S. (2017) 'Cultural Capital: Arts Graduates, Spatial Inequality, and London's Impact on Cultural Labor Markets', *American Behavioral Scientist* 61(12), 1510–1531.

Data and methods

This project builds on and develops a full, now global, field concerned with cultural work and cultural consumption. As this is not an academic paper, we have avoided, where possible, extensive references. However, an indication of the massive volume of academic research that has shaped and informed this work can be seen in the full papers underpinning this report, along with the extensive lists of references in each.

The report summarises a specific set of research papers, using specific datasets. It is not a comprehensive picture of every axis of social inequality. For example, one part of the project primarily focused on social class and its relationship to social mobility, with ethnicity and gender as important intersecting elements of the analysis. However, this focus meant it was not possible, for this report, to focus on other important aspects of inequality. The team are not experts in the field of disability or sexuality and LGBTQI studies, meaning those two axes of inequality are not the focus of the project. Disability in the cultural and creative workforce is a topic of particular importance for future work, particularly in light of recent Arts Council England research.²³

Parts 1 and 3: Panic! dataset

In 2015, Create London, the originators of the *Panic!* project, worked with *The Guardian* and an academic team to run a survey of people working in Britain's cultural sector. Survey data was collected over the period 21 September to 20 October.

The survey consisted of questions on respondents' creative work, their sources of income and outgoings, their attitudes towards the sector(s), their social network, and relevant demographics.

The survey questionnaire was designed to use similar or identical question wording to that used in nationally representative surveys. For example, questions about work, social origin, and demographic characteristics were designed to be comparable with questions from the quarterly Office for National Statistics' (ONS) Labour Force Survey.

The final question in the web survey asked respondents to leave their email address if they were interested in being contacted for any further research; in response, 55% of respondents left their email address. These respondents were emailed in January of 2016 to confirm their interest.

Interviews were conducted by a mixture of Skype, telephone and face to face; they were audio recorded, and lasted around an hour. During the interviews, participants were asked about their background and trajectory into their creative work, their influences, their work history and current work, reflections on success, social class and other

barriers, and their own cultural tastes and interests. The audio recordings of the interviews were then transcribed and coded

Interviewees gave their informed consent to the use of interview data on the basis of it being non-attributable and anonymised. In this report we have used pseudonyms and removed identifying characteristics from the data.

Working for free formed a dedicated sub-section of the interview schedule, interviewers asking variations on the question 'Do you ever have to work for free?' In many cases this was unnecessary, as a large fraction of interviewees independently discussed working without pay during the course of the interview.

The survey attracted 2,487 responses and the research team conducted follow-up interviews with 237 participants.

Part 2: Office for National Statistics' Labour Force Survey and Longitudinal Study

The first part of the analysis in Part 2 draws on two academic papers studying the demographics in the creative industries. The data here is from the ONS' Labour Force Survey. This is the largest nationally representative sample of employment in the United Kingdom, with around 100,000 respondents surveyed annually. It is the basis for employment and unemployment figures, and covers topics such as hours worked, earnings, and a range of demographic characteristics.

The Labour Force Survey now includes a question on social origin, asking about parental occupation during a respondent's teenage years. Parental occupation is one of the ways social scientists talk about social class. It is also one of the methods social scientists use to understand social mobility.

The second part of the analysis looks specifically at social mobility. This section uses the ONS Longitudinal Study (ONS-LS). This is a 1% sample of census returns for England and Wales, based on four birthdays. People with these birthdays are linked between censuses since 1971, so that we can follow people through their life course without relying on fallible memories.

It's not the only data source on social mobility – the UK has an excellent series of cohort studies – but the ONS-LS has the advantages of a large sample size, extraordinary response rates (as the census is compulsory) and very high linkage rates between censuses. As we can also see details of their households, we can compare the jobs that subjects' parents had when they were teenagers to the work that they themselves do at later points in time.

For this study we defined cohorts that were born during 10-year periods, from 1953–62, 63–72, 73–82 and 83–92, so that they are aged 9 to 18 at their first census (1971 for cohort 1) and aged 19–28 at their second census (1981 for cohort 1). We've only included in our analysis those who are living with at least one parent in work, so that we can assess their social class origin.

²³ Arts Council England (2017) *Making a Shift Report*. Available at www.artscouncil.org.uk/sites/default/files/download-file/ACE206%20MAKING%20A%20SHIFT%20Report%20FINAL.pdf

Part 4: The British Social Attitudes Survey and the Department for Culture, Media and Sport's Taking Part Survey

The first part of the analysis uses data from the British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey. This is a long-running social survey that interviews a random, nationally representative, sample of around 3,000 people about a range of social issues. The survey questions are designed to be consistent over time, although new topics are added to reflect changes in society. For example, attitudes towards the rights of gay people have been a longstanding set of questions for the survey.

In our analysis we look at two clusters of questions, about left and right positions in politics, and liberal and authoritarian social attitudes. These include responses to statements including '*Government should redistribute income from the better off to those who are less well off*' and '*Ordinary working people do not get their fair share of the nation's wealth*' (for left and right values) and statements including '*Young people today don't have enough respect for traditional British values*' and '*Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards*.' (for liberal and authoritarian values).

Our research used six waves, from 2010 to 2015, to ensure a large enough sample of people for analysis.

The findings present an analysis of responses by occupation, looking at the differences between arts workers, and other occupational groups, such as those in construction, finance or agriculture.

The next part of the analysis uses the Taking Part survey. This survey has run annually since 2005/2006, and currently has around 10,000 respondents in each annual wave. As with BSA, the questions are designed to be consistent over time, with some questions being introduced or dropped each year. It focuses on culture and sport, particularly how people spend their time: what events they attend, what they participate in, their volunteering, and so on.

In our analysis, we focus on questions about the cultural events they have attended, including going to a film at the cinema; a play or drama; a jazz performance; and to a carnival. We investigate the events people have attended in the context of their occupations. Occupations are treated both in the broad sense, of which social class their jobs are in (according to the National Statistics Socio-economic Classification), and whether they work in one of a list of groups of jobs in the cultural and creative industries, such as media professionals or archivists and librarians.

This research uses data from 2005/06 to 2012/13, as those are the waves where specific data on people's occupations were available.

We've also included a longer discussion of key terms and ideas, such as social class and social mobility, in the next section of this report.

Key terms

In this report we've presented a lot of analysis from a range of different datasets. We've also used a series of technical terms, particularly in relation to class and the creative industries. In order to clarify some of the meanings and ideas, this section presents more detail of key ideas.

BAME

When thinking about race and ethnicity, Arts Council England (ACE) use the grouping 'Black and Minority Ethnic'. We've shortened this to 'BAME'.²⁴ The term is contested, and there are several problems associated with bringing diverse ethnic groups together under one category. There are also risks that the category leads us to ignore the fact that White British is also an ethnic group. However, we have followed ACE's terminology, particularly in order to highlight underrepresentations in the labour force. In the *Panic!* work, whether someone is classified as BAME is based on their response to the question 'What is your ethnic group?'

Cultural and creative industries

The cultural and creative industries (CCIs) have a complex and contested history. The formal definition of this group of industries and occupations within British government policy came in the late 1990s with a set of mapping documents. Since then the definition has been refined, particularly in light of debates over the role of IT and computer services.

The current definition of what the government calls 'creative industries' is based on the levels of creative activity and creative occupations within that industry.²⁵

This definition currently includes nine areas within the cultural and creative industries: *Advertising and marketing; Architecture; Crafts; Design; Film, TV, video, radio and photography; IT, software and computer services; Publishing; Museums, galleries and libraries; Music, performing and visual art.*

Within these nine clusters, the government uses two sets of classifications to create estimates of the economic activity within creative industries: Standard Industrial Classifications (SIC) and Standard Occupational Classifications (SOC). SIC codes refer to types of industry, to understand business activity. SOC codes are focused on sets of occupations, to understand jobs. In the current government definition, the nine clusters of creative industries correspond to 30 individual occupations. For example,

24. Arts Council England (2016) *Equality, Diversity and the Creative Case*. Available at www.artscouncil.org.uk/sites/default/files/download-file/Equality_diversity_creativecase_2015_16_web_0.pdf

25. DCMS (2017) *Creative Industries Economic Estimates Methodology*. Available at www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/499683/CIEE_Methodology.pdf

Publishing consists of (SOC 2471) *Journalists, newspaper and periodical editors* and (SOC 3412) *Authors, writers and translators*.

There are also 31 individual industrial sectors within the nine clusters of creative industries. To continue the example of Publishing, it consists of six types of industrial activity (SIC 58.11) *Book publishing*; (SIC 58.12) *Publishing of directories and mailing lists*; (SIC 58.13) *Publishing of newspapers*; (SIC 58.14) *Publishing of journals and periodicals*; (SIC 58.19) *Other publishing activities*; and (SIC 74.30) *Translation and interpretation activities*.

The nine clusters of creative industries contain many of areas of the economy that are different and distinctive from each other, but are brought together under the government's estimate of the level of creative activity within them. *Architects* (SOC 2431), for example, are characterised by formal barriers to entry and long periods of study. This is very different to *Artists* (SOC 3411), who may be self-taught and do not require formal qualifications to practise. Likewise, occupations in *Crafts*, for example *Smiths and forge workers* (SOC 5211), have a distinctive skillset and job role compared with *Information technology and telecommunications directors* (SOC 1136).

The SOC codes are a means of clustering occupations together, based on shared characteristics such as manual and non-manual labour, autonomy and supervision of other workers.

'Core' creative jobs

In terms of our analysis we have focused on creative occupations rather than industries—so, for example, graphic designers who work for accountancy firms are included, but accountants who work for a theatre are not. This is the conventional way to analyse social mobility (see below).

In order to look at trends over time, we have had to translate these codes back to previous categorisations. For this reason, we have not included *Crafts* in our analysis of change over time: many current *Crafts* occupations are skilled manufacturing (for example, *Forge worker*) rather than the kind of home-based artisanal work that the name conjures, and it becomes increasingly difficult to decide whether jobs related to metalworking, for example, should be included as a craft.

We have also needed to group occupations together in order to have large enough numbers of people for meaningful analysis. We created a core cultural occupations category, which includes artists, actors, entertainers, musicians and people working in publishing, media, libraries, museums and galleries. These are the jobs that we consider to be most involved in creating, curating and presenting the culture that we consume. They also, collectively, constitute a robust number of people to analyse. While there will be differences between occupations with-

in this group, we have not included any occupation to which the overall findings do not apply (so there is no evidence of a 'golden age' in any of these occupations, for example).

Class

Class is a deeply contested term in Britain. On the one hand it describes a technical set of classifications used by social researchers; on the other it is about individuals' and communities' sense of identity. It can be used as a shorthand for social divisions and social inequalities, and it can be about occupations and their relations to working conditions and the labour market. As a result, class is a confusing term.

In this project, we use the National Statistics Socio-economic Classification (NS-SEC).²⁶ NS-SEC clusters occupations together into eight groups, from I (higher managerial and professional, which includes doctors, CEOs and lawyers) to VII (routine occupations such as bar staff, care workers, and cleaners), while VIII is those who have never worked or who are long-term unemployed. The NS-SEC allows us to do two things. It gives a clear definition of class, which is based on employment and occupation. It also allows us to comment on class-based forms of inequality.

Our work has focused on cultural and creative occupations. Aside from *Crafts*, cultural and creative occupations are almost all placed in the NS-SEC I and II categories. This means we can think of them as 'middle class' jobs, even though they may be low-paid and precarious for many people trying to work in them.

This technical, employment and occupation-based understanding of class is of course not the only way to understand class relations. To fully understand cultural and creative occupations and any related inequalities, it is also important to ask how see employment and occupational relations intersect with characteristics such as gender, ethnicity or disability. It is also important to think about the meaning of a category such as class, beyond just the employment and occupation categorisation. This work is the subject of extensive academic research, along with public and media debate, and individuals' own sense of identity. Discussing how the technical categories interact and shape individual identity might be a fruitful area for artistic and cultural work, given how central the contested category of class remains to British society.

2. A full and extensive discussion of the NS-SEC is available from the ONS <https://www.ons.gov.uk/methodology/classificationsandstandards/otherclassifications/nationalstatistics socioeconomicclassificationnssecbasedonsoc2010>

Social mobility

The confusion surrounding class, and the difference between how the term is used in popular media and the academy, is similar to the confusion surrounding social mobility. In media and popular discussion social mobility is often a shorthand for the sorts of social inequalities that class is also describing (along with various other axes of inequality such as gender and ethnicity).

However, in academic research social mobility has a precise definition. It describes the rates of individuals moving from one social class to another, from their *origin* class to their *destination* class. It is a description of probability, rather than a comment on the fairness, or morality, of individuals moving classes. For some people there is no movement, the class they are born into is the class they end up in. For others there is long- or short-range mobility between classes.

The idea of long- or short-range mobility is dependent on seeing class as a set of occupational groups. Our work adopts this approach to class, using the NS-SEC described above. The overall rates of social mobility are the total numbers who end up working in a different NS-SEC category from the work their parents did when they were around 14.

In the most recent surveys of the labour force, the ONS has asked people about their class origin. They have done this by asking what the main income earner in their household did for work when they were about 14. Knowing if someone had a parent who was a doctor (NS-SEC I) or a cleaner (NS-SEC VII) allows us to understand their class origin. We can say, for the purpose of understanding the broad patterns in the labour force, how many working- or middle class origin people there are. Once we know this, we can compare those origins to destinations, for example asking how many children of cleaners (NS-SEC VII) end up working as doctors (NS-SEC I). This allows us to understand social mobility in society, how many of origins are different from destinations.

As we have said, cultural and creative industries are defined as middle class jobs for the purposes of NS-SEC. However, many people within those jobs draw on class identities that are about their social starting point. Here we return to the question of *origins* and *destinations*. Because the ONS now collects information on parental occupation, we are able to estimate the numbers of creative workers who are from middle class origins (for example the children of doctors, defined as NS-SEC I) or working class origins (for example, the children of cleaners, defined as NS-SEC VII). We can ask questions about the rate of social mobility, of how open cultural and creative occupations are to people from specific social origins, and whether specific social origins are under- or over-represented in cultural and creative jobs.

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